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QUESTIONS PRESENTED
I. WHETHER PARTICULATE MERCURY EMITTED FROM
BUENA VISTA'S SMOKE STACKS IS SOLID WASTE.
II. WHETHER FRIENDS OF LAKE TOKAY, INC. HAS
STANDING TO FILE SUIT AGAINST BUENA VISTA
UNDER RCRA SECTION 7002 AND ARTICLE III FOR VIO-
LATIONS OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT, WHEN ITS MEM-
BERS CAN NO LONGER EAT THE FISH FROM LAKE
TOKAY BECAUSE MERCURY EMISSIONS FROM BUENA
* This brief has been reprinted in its original form. No revisions, other than
minor technical revisions, have been made by the editorial staff of the Pace Environ-
mental Law Review.
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VISTA'S PLANTS CAUSED MERCURY BIOACCUMULA-
TION IN THE FISH AND THE THREAT OF FUTURE IN-
JURY EXISTS FROM EXPOSURE TO MERCURY IN THE
LAKE.
III. WHETHER THE STATE OF NEW UNION HAS STANDING
TO INTERVENE IN THE CITIZEN SUIT FILED BY
FRIENDS OF LAKE TOKAY, WHEN THE CITIZEN SUIT
PROVISIONS EXPRESSLY PROVIDE FOR INTERVEN-
TION AS A MATTER OF RIGHT, THE STATE OF NEW
UNION MEETS THE REQUIREMENTS OF RCRA SEC-
TION 7002(b)(2)(E), AND FED. R. CIV. P. 24 PROVIDES
FOR STATE INTERVENTION.
IV. WHETHER THE DISTRICT COURT HAS THE AUTHORITY
TO ORDER ABATEMENT OF BUENA VISTA'S MERCURY
EMISSIONS, WHEN THE CITIZEN SUIT PROVISIONS OF
RCRA PROVIDE FOR INJUNCTIVE RELIEF, THE CLEAN
AIR ACT IS NOT SO DETAILED AND PERVASIVE AS TO
PRECLUDE RECOVERY UNDER THE RESOURCE CON-
SERVATION AND RECOVERY ACT, AND BUENA VISTA
EMITS SOLID WASTE THAT FALLS WITHIN THE DEFI-
NITION OF HAZARDOUS WASTE.
V. WHETHER THE CIRCUIT COURT HAS THE AUTHORITY
TO RULE ON BUENA VISTA'S MOTION TO DISMISS
WHEN ITS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS
DISPOSITIVE AND THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT
RENDER A DECISION.
VI. WHETHER FRIENDS OF LAKE TOKAY'S SUIT IS
BARRED BY SECTION 7002 OF RCRA OR THE DOC-
TRINES OF PRECLUSION WHEN A CONCLUDED STATE
COURT ACTION AGAINST THE SAME DEFENDANT DE-
CIDED A SIMILAR CASE WITH SIMILAR FACTS UNDER
STATE LAW, BOTH THE ADMINISTRATOR OF EPA AND
THE STATE OF NEW UNION FAILED TO FILE SUIT, AND
CONGRESS INTENDED CITIZEN SUITS TO BE FILED IN
FEDERAL COURT.
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OPINION BELOW
The opinion and final judgment of the United States District
Court for the District of New Union is not published, but is located
in the Transcript of the Record at 3-9.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND
REGULATIONS INVOLVED
The constitutional provisions, statutes, and regulations rele-
vant to the determination of the present case are listed in the Ta-
ble of Authorities.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Course of Proceedings and Disposition in the Court Below
This is an appeal from an order entered by Judge R. N. Remus
in the United States District Court for the District of New Union,
rendered September 1, 1999, on the parties' cross motions for
summary judgment. Appellant, Friends of Lake Tokay, Inc.
("FLT"), appeals the district court decision in favor of Buena Vista
Power Company ("Buena Vista"), barring FLT's claim under the
Clean Air Act ("CAA") and denying it standing. (R. at 5.) Buena
Vista cross appeals the district court decision in favor of FLT,
holding that the particulate mercury emitted by the Buena Vista
plants is solid waste. (R. at 4.) In granting Buena Vista's motion
for summary judgment, the district court did not reach its motion
to dismiss and Buena Vista requests the Circuit Court to rule on
its motion. (R. at 1, 5.) Appellant challenges the findings of the
district court on both the standing issue and the proscription of
FLT's suit by the CAA.
Statement of the Facts
FLT is a not-for-profit corporation organized for the protec-
tion of Lake Tokay ("Lake"), located in the State of New Union.
(R. at 1, 3.) For over twenty years its members have enjoyed fish-
ing on the Lake and dining on their catch. (R. at 4.) However, the
New Union Department of Public Health issued a health advisory
advising the public against eating the fish and banning the sale of
fish from the Lake after it determined that fish from the Lake con-
tained unacceptable levels of mercury. (R. at 4.) Although FLT's
members are still able to fish there for pleasure, health risks asso-
ciated with the mercury level in the fish make the consumption of
any Lake fish untenable. (R. at 4.)
Buena Vista owns two coal-fired power plants in the nearby
state of Blue Skies that emit particles of mercury from its smoke
stack into the atmosphere. (R. at 3.) Buena Vista denies the mer-
cury particles are transported through the air from Blue Skies to
New Union where they fall directly into the Lake and onto land in
the watershed of the Lake. The record is silent as to any other
major source of mercury in the area, and does not speak to
whether or not the mercury particles generated by Buena Vista
stay within the state of Blue Skies. (R. at 3.) Nonetheless, EPA
studies conclude that most of the mercury in the Lake is gener-
ated from Buena Vista's two power plants in Blue Skies. (R. at 4.)
[Vol. 17
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Two of FLT's members complained that they were no longer
able to eat fish from the lake, and FLT filed suit against Buena
Vista under the citizen suit provision of section 7002 of the Re-
source Conservation and Recovery Act ("RCRA"), alleging that
Buena Vista's emissions were causing an imminent and substan-
tial endangerment to health and the environment. (R. at 4.) FLT
sought an injunction to stop all mercury emissions from Buena
Vista's plants, and New Union intervened. (R. at 3.) In consider-
ing the parties' cross motions for summary judgment, the district
court held that even though the mercury particles are solid waste
as defined by RCRA, FLT lacked standing to sue Buena Vista, and
that the State of New Union need not prove standing. (R. at 5.)
The district court further held that FLT and New Union's suit
under RCRA was barred by the CAA. (R. at 5.) Buena Vista's mo-
tion to dismiss, alleging the concluded state action in Bluepeace,
Inc. v. Buena Vista Power Co., No. 98-27, slip op. (Coughlin Co.
Sup. Ct. Jan 5, 1999), barred the present litigation under RCRA or
the preclusion doctrines, was not considered or decided by the dis-
trict court, since it deemed the motion for summary judgment dis-
positve. (R. at 5.)
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The mercury emitted from Buena Vista's smoke stacks consti-
tutes solid waste as defined under RCRA. The plain language of
the statute indicates that the mercury particles are solid waste
and are covered under RCRA. According to RCRA section
1004(3), waste which is eventually discharged or placed into or on
any land or water may be regulated. Although the mercury emit-
ted from the power plants is emitted into the air first, its resting
place is on the land surrounding Lake Tokay and in the Lake
itself.
The trial court incorrectly determined that FLT lacked stand-
ing to bring suit under section 7002 of RCRA. FLT meets all the
requirements, both statutorily and constitutionally, to achieve
standing in this case. EPA conducted studies which conclude that
mercury particles contained in the emissions from Buena Vista's
power plants in the state of Blue Skies are the source of most of
the mercury found in the Lake. FLT brought this action in equity
against Buena Vista under the citizen suit provision of section
7002 of RCRA because mercury levels in the Lake rose to the
point that the New Union Department of Health issued a health
advisory banning the sale of fish and cautioning against consum-
20001 525
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ing any fish from the Lake due to the potential of mercury poison-
ing. This prevents members of FLT from continuing their twenty-
year tradition of eating the fish they catch from the Lake. Thus,
Buena Vista's power plants are the source of an imminent and
substantial endangerment, for which the only remedy under
RCRA is in equity, and FLT meets the RCRA requirements to
bring a citizen suit as well as organizational standing to represent
its members.
Additionally, FLT has satisfied all of the Article III constitu-
tional requirements for standing. FLT suffered an injury in fact
which is fairly traceable to the mercury emitted by Buena Vista's
smoke stacks. The injury is redressable by judicial action and is
within the zone of interest sought to be protected by the statute.
The State of New Union has a dual right of intervention
under RCRA section 7002(b)(2)(E) and Rule 24 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure because it is protecting the interest of its
citizens who are affected by the mercury pollution. Its exclusion
from this litigation would impair or impede its ability to protect
this interest.
The lower court incorrectly determined that it did not have
the equitable power to grant an injunction because the CAA was
pervasive and preempted RCRA. The CAA is not comprehensive
in all situations. The CAA only regulates air pollution that
threatens ambient air quality standards. This leaves gaps in the
Act's regulations, which are exemplified in cases such as this one.
The CAA does not regulate power plants nor does it contain spe-
cific limitations on mercury emissions. Both of these factors are
present in this case. RCRA, on the other hand, grants citizens and
courts broader coverage and remedies. If there is a situation that
presents an imminent and substantial endangerment, then a citi-
zen may bring suit. The mercury emitted from the smoke stacks
presented this endangerment when it contaminated the water and
the fish in the Lake. Congress intended to make available a
course of action in circumstances such as this. Therefore, the
lower court did have the equitable authority to grant an injunction
under RCRA.
Moreover, the Circuit Court is precluded from considering
Buena Vista's motion to dismiss because the district court did not
render a decision on it. It is well settled within Title 28 of the U.S.
Code that courts of appeals only have jurisdiction to review deci-
sions rendered by the trial court. Thus, when no decision has been
[Vol. 17526
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rendered by the district court, the circuit court has nothing to
review.
However, in the event this Court determines that it does have
the authority to review the pending motion, FLT's claim is not
barred under section 7002 of RCRA or the doctrines of collateral
estoppel or res judicata. When Congress enacted RCRA, it in-
tended that citizens have the right to bring a private cause of ac-
tion against polluters when both the Administrator of the EPA
and the state fail to diligently prosecute polluters for causing im-
minent and substantial endangerment to health or the environ-
ment. Moreover, this is a federal claim brought in federal court by
a plaintiff who was unable to intervene in the state suit in Blue
Skies. The state action, based on a state claim for trespass and
nuisance, is not based on imminent and substantial endanger-
ment, and thus the doctrines of collateral estoppel and res judi-
cata do not apply.
Consequently, FLT requests the circuit court affirm the dis-
trict court's ruling that mercury is a solid waste. Since the district
court erred in determining that FLT has no standing to bring this
claim and that the CAA prevents courts from granting injunctive
relief, FLT respectfully requests that this Court reverse the judg-
ment entered by the district court and remand for a full trial on
the merits of the case. FLT further requests this Court to deny
Buena Vista's petition to review its pending motion to dismiss.
ARGUMENT
I. THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY HELD THAT
PARTICULATE MERCURY EMITTED FROM
BUENA VISTA'S SMOKE STACKS IS SOLID
WASTE BECAUSE THE PLAIN LANGUAGE OF
RCRA AND CONGRESSIONAL INTENT INDICATE
THE MERCURY PARTICLES ARE SOLID WASTE.
Friends of Lake Tokay, Inc. brought this claim under the citi-
zen suit provision of the Resource Conservation Recovery Act,
which has been codified in Title 42, § 6972(a)(1)(B) of the United
States Code. This section provides in pertinent part that "[a]ny
person may commence a civil action on his own behalf.., against
any person.., who has contributed.., to the past or present...
handling, storage, treatment, transportation, or disposal of any
solid or hazardous waste which may present an imminent and
substantial endangerment to health or the environment." RCRA
2000] 527
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§ 7002(a)(1)(B), 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(B). The district court cor-
rectly held that mercury was a solid waste under section 7002 of
RCRA. The determination of whether mercury is a solid waste
under RCRA and EPA regulations is one of statutory construction
and legislative intent.
The issue of whether mercury emissions are solid waste under
RCRA is solved by looking at the statutory construction employed
by Congress. The first step in statutory interpretation is analysis
of the language itself. As the Supreme Court explained, "[t]he
starting point in every case of statutory construction is the lan-
guage employed by Congress." Zands v. Nelson, 779 F.Supp. 1254,
1261 (S.D. Ca. 1991) (quoting Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S.
330, 337 (1979)). Under RCRA, hazardous waste is a subset of
solid waste. See RCRA § 1004(5), 42 U.S.C. § 6903(5). For a
waste to be classified as hazardous it must first qualify as a solid
waste. See id. Therefore, before deciding whether Buena Vista's
mercury emissions are covered under RCRA, it must be proven
that the particles are solid waste.
RCRA defines the term solid waste as "any... discarded ma-
terial." Id. The statute does not define "discarded" but the Code
of Federal Regulations defines "discarded" as any material that is
abandoned. See 40 C.F.R. § 261.2(a)(2) (1999). The Code also
states that materials are solid wastes if they are "abandoned" by
being "disposed" of. See 40 C.F.R. § 261.2(b) (1999). The statutory
definition of disposal is synonymous with "discarded," and is the
"discharge ... or placing of any solid waste or hazardous waste
into or on any land or water." RCRA § 1004(3), 42 U.S.C.
§ 6903(3).
Despite the apparent ambiguity in these circuitous definitions
of solid and hazardous waste, it is clear that solid waste has a very
broad definition. In the present case, the lower court held that the
mercury particles emitted from Buena Vista's plants fit into the
broad definition of solid waste. The district court correctly rea-
soned that the mercury particles are discharged out of the plants'
stacks, come to rest on the land surrounding the Lake, and even-
tually enter the Lake. (R. at 5.) As such, the mercury particles at
issue here clearly fit the statutory definition of solid waste. Stat-
utory analysis indicates that mercury particles are a discarded
material because they are abandoned. Next, they are abandoned
because they are disposed of. Finally, they are disposed of because
the mercury particles from Buena Vista's plants' comport with the
requirement of RCRA section 1004(a); they are "discharged or
528 [Vol. 17
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placed onto or on land or water such that they enter the environ-
ment, air or water," which in this case is the land surrounding
Lake Tokay and the Lake itself. RCRA § 1004(a), 42 U.S.C.
§ 6903(a).
The District Court for the Southern District of California has
dealt with the issue of defining and determining what constitutes
solid waste. See Zands, 779 F.Supp. 1254. The court in Zands
had to decide whether leaking gas was a solid waste. See id. at
1257. The plaintiffs alleged that during the time the defendants
owned the property in question, large amounts of gasoline leaked
into the soil and groundwater. See id. at 1262. The defendants
argued that gasoline was a useful product and, thus, was not a
discarded material. Since it was not discarded, it was not a solid
waste. See id. However, the court held that gasoline is no longer
a useful product after it leaks into, and contaminates, the soil. See
id. As a result, the court determined that the gasoline was aban-
doned via the leakage into the soil and fit the broad definition of
solid waste as a discarded material. See id.
The courts dealt with a comparable situation when the fed-
eral government brought suit against owners and operators of a
metal refinishing facility for improper treatment, disposal, and
storage of hazardous waste. See United States v. Power Eng'g Co.,
10 F.Supp. 2d 1145 (D. Colo. 1998). The court was faced with the
issue of whether hexavalent chromium condensate mist was solid
waste under RCRA. The defendants contended that because the
air scrubbers discharge the condensate into the air, the discharge
does not constitute placement of solid waste "into or on any land
or water." Id. at 1158. The court did not agree with the defen-
dant's argument. See id. The court reasoned that the condensate
eventually settled onto the land and, thus, fit the broad definition
of disposal. See id. Additionally, because the facility "disposed" of
the condensate, it constitutes "discarded material" and, therefore,
"solid waste." See id.
Although the courts in Zands and Power Engineering Com-
pany did not deal with mercury, the methodology the courts used
in determining what constitutes solid waste is analogous to the
facts in the present case. The mercury particles emitted from the
smoke stacks and discarded onto the surrounding ground and
water are no longer "useful products." The Zands court recog-
nized that solid waste is defined broadly and that "solid waste is
'any discarded material."' Zands at 1252. By this definition alone,
the mercury was clearly discarded from the smoke stacks. Addi-
BRIEF2000] 529
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tionally, the facts in Power Eng'g Company are similar to the facts
presented in this case. The mercury found on the ground was
emitted from Buena Vista's smoke stacks just as the condensate
was emitted from Power Engineering Company's air scrubbers.
See Power Eng'g Co. at 1149. The court ruled that eventually the
condensate made it to the ground and was thus discarded. See id.
at 1165. The scenario is identical here. Although the mercury
particles were discharged into open air, they were eventually dis-
carded onto the soil surrounding the Lake. (R. at 4.)
Statutory interpretation indicates that mercury particles are
solid waste. The regulations and statutes are dense, turgid, and
circuitous. However, a careful reading of the chain of definitions
indicates that a material is a solid waste if it is discharged or
placed onto land or water. See RCRA § 7002(a)(1)(B).
Beyond statutory interpretation, Congress intended to have a
strict regulatory regime in place for people who dealt with hazard-
ous waste, so they created the "cradle to grave" concept. See City
of Chicago v. Environmental Defense Fund, 511 U.S. 328, 331
(1994). Once a showing has been made that a material is a solid
waste under section 7002 of RCRA, a person can also prevail by
demonstrating that the defendant handled, stored, treated or
transported solid waste from its cradle to its grave. See id. Buena
Vista's mercury emissions violate the "cradle to grave" concept in-
tended by Congress.
Case law also indicates that solid waste is defined very
broadly and is left to statutory interpretation. See Zands, 779
F.Supp. at 1262. For this reason, the Court should uphold the
lower court's ruling that mercury particles emitted from Buena
Vista's smoke stacks are solid waste for purposes of RCRA.
II. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT
FRIENDS OF LAKE TOKAY, INC. HAS NO
STANDING TO FILE SUIT AGAINST BUENA
VISTA BECAUSE FRIENDS OF LAKE TOKAY
FALLS WITHIN THE CITIZEN SUIT PROVISIONS
OF RCRA AS WELL AS ARTICLE III STANDING
REQUIREMENTS OF THE CONSTITUTION.
In order to establish a prima facie case for a citizen suit under
RCRA, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the alleged endanger-
ment stems from solid or hazardous waste as defined by RCRA,
that the endangerment is imminent and substantial, and that the
defendant has contributed to, or is contributing to, the handling,
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storage, treatment, transportation, or disposal of the waste at is-
sue. See RCRA § 7002(a)(1)(B), 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(B).
A. FLT Meets the Requirements to Bring a Citizens Suit
Under RCRA Section 7002.
FLT is an environmental advocacy group and has standing to
bring this action by virtue of its members. Organizations such as
FLT may assert standing if they can show that (1) the organiza-
tion's members would have standing to sue on their own; (2) the
interest the organization seeks to protect are germane to its pur-
pose; and (3) neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested
requires individual participation by its members. See L.E.A.D. v.
Exide Corp., No. CIV. 96-3030, 1999 WL 124473, at *20 (E.D. Pa.
Feb. 19, 1999) (quoting Public Interest Research Group of N.J. v.
Powell Duffryn Terminals, Inc., 913 F.2d 64, 70 (3d Cir. 1990)).
The Eastern District of Pennsylvania similarly dealt with this
issue when Exide argued that the plaintiff environmental organi-
zations had no standing to sue for alleged water and air pollution
claims. See id. at *20. However, the organizations each had mem-
bers who had standing to sue in their own right. These members
lived by the facility and attested to offensive odors and visibility
problems stemming from the facility emissions, which constrained
their outdoor recreational activities. See id. at *13. The district
court in that case found that the organizations had standing to
sue because members of the organizations had a sufficient connec-
tion to the dispute and would have standing to sue in their own
right. See id. at *20.
In this case, the affidavits of FLT members Steven Jones and
Artimus Winfred demonstrate that they both had standing to sue
in their own right because they were no longer able to enjoy their
long standing tradition of eating the fish they caught from the
Lake due to the risk of mercury poisoning. (R. at 4.) Their enjoy-
ment from fishing on the Lake has been diminished, establishing
a sufficient connection to the dispute to assert standing. Thus,
FLT satisfies the first prong of the organizational standing test
set forth in L.E.A.D., because its members have suffered an injury
in fact and would have standing to sue in their own right. Since
FLT was organized solely for the protection of the Lake, the inter-
est it seeks to protect is germane to its purpose, and the second
prong of the L.E.A.D. test is satisfied. Finally, the asserted claims
do not require the participation of individual members. Since FLT
meets the three-prong test set forth in L.E.A.D., this Court should
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hold it has organizational standing to sue on behalf of its members
who have standing.
Secondly, Buena Vista contributes to the disposal of solid
waste by virtue of the cradle-to-grave concept. When Congress en-
acted RCRA, it sought to close "the last remaining loophole in en-
vironmental law, that of unregulated land disposal of discarded
materials and hazardous wastes." H.R. REP. No. 94-1491, at 4
(1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6238, 6241. Once it has
been shown that a material is a solid waste under section 7002 of
RCRA, a person can also prevail by showing the defendant im-
properly handled, stored, treated or transported solid waste. See
id. As previously discussed, Buena Vista's mercury emissions vio-
late the cradle-to-grave concept intended by Congress because it
disposes of solid waste through its emissions into the air, with its
resting place in the Lake and its surrounding land.
Finally, to assert standing in a RCRA citizen suit case, the
plaintiff must show that the solid waste presents an imminent
and substantial endangerment to health or the environment. See
RCRA § 7002(a)(1)(B). RCRA's waste management criteria for fa-
cilities are designed not only to prevent but also to mitigate en-
dangerments to public health and the environment. See H.R. REP.
No. 94-1491, at 4 (1976).
A finding of "imminency" does not require a showing that a
concrete harm will occur immediately so long as the risk of
threatened harm is present. See Environmental Defense Fund v.
EPA, 465 F.2d 528, 535 (D.C. Cir. 1972). Moreover, the word
"may" was intended by Congress to provide the courts with broad
equitable powers that are not limited to emergency situations, but
rather extend to eliminating any risk posed. See United States v.
Price, 688 F.2d 204, 214 (3d Cir. 1982).
In considering whether to grant injunctive relief to the gov-
ernment against the owners of a former landfill to correct hazards
created by past chemical dumping, the Third Circuit reviewed the
Eckhardt Report (H.R. COMM. PRINT No. 96-IFC, at 3 (1979)) to
assess whether the hazardous waste was an imminent and sub-
stantial endangerment. See Price at 213. The Price court relied
on the Eckhardt Report's definition of "imminent" as pertaining to
the "nature of the threat" rather than "identification of the time"
when the endangerment initially arose, and held that Congress
intended RCRA to authorize the cleanup of a site if that action is
necessary to abate a present threat to the public health or the en-
vironment. See id. at 214.
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In 1999, the Eastern District Court in Pennsylvania held that
the risk for harm should be great, but neither the term "immi-
nent" nor "endangerment" required a showing of actual harm. See
L.E.A.D. v. Exide Corp., No. Civ. 96-3030, 1999 WL 124473, at *8
(E.D. Pa. Feb. 19, 1999) (citing Dague v. City of Burlington, 935
F.2d 1343, 1356 (2d Cir. 1991) (rev'd in part on other grounds, 505
U.S. 557 (1992)). In L.E.A.D., the Pennsylvania court determined
that the ongoing presence of lead in the soil around Exide's facility
was at least sufficient to leave an issue of material fact for the
court to consider as to ongoing endangerment. See id. at *6.
Courts have consistently held that "endangerment" means a
threatened or potential harm and does not require proof of actual
harm. See Dague at 1356. In Dague, the Second Circuit upheld
the district court's finding that a landfill presented an imminent
and substantial endangerment to health and environment. The
district court reasoned that hazardous chemicals leaking into the
soil and into groundwater which was toxic to freshwater aquatic
life impacted water quality. See id. The court further affirmed
that toxic chemicals found in groundwater wells had increased
over time, were bio-accumulating in another area, and were an
imminent endangerment, even though the actual harm
threatened had not yet occurred. See id. By citing Environmental
Defense Fund v. EPA, 465 F.2d 528, 535 (D.C. Cir. 1972), the
Dague court reiterated that an "imminent hazard may be declared
at any point in a chain of events which may ultimately result in
harm to the public." Dague at 1356.
In the case at hand, the New Union Department of Health
issued a health advisory notifying the public that regularly eating
fish in the Lake would cause mercury poisoning. (R. at 4.) Moreo-
ver, the health department banned the sale of fish, and advised
against consumption of any fish from the Lake. See id. Even
though no reported cases of mercury poisoning have arisen, the
threat of mercury poisoning and risk for harm from mercury
poisoning creates an imminent and substantial endangerment to
public health. Additionally, the environment has already been af-
fected because mercury has bioaccumulated in fish in the Lake.
The EPA report concluded that most of the mercury in the
Lake originated from Buena Vista's plants and that the air pollu-
tion emissions from Buena Vista's two power plants emit particu-
late mercury. (R. at 4.) Mercury has been held to be a solid waste.
Buena Vista disposes of the mercury into the Lake, and mercury
bioaccumulates in the fish from the Lake and is hazardous to peo-
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ple's health if they eat it. Therefore, FLT's members have dimin-
ished use and enjoyment of the Lake because an imminent and
substantial endangerment exists. Thus, the elements to assert
standing and a prima facie case under RCRA section 7002 have
been met.
B. FLT Satisfies Article III Constitutional Requirements for
Standing.
Under the Constitution, Article III limits the jurisdiction of
the federal courts to an actual "case or controversy." Allen v.
Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750 (1984). The Supreme Court has defined
the constitutional requirements for standing through case law.
See Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Sepa-
ration of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464 (1982); see also Lu-
jan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-561 (1992). The
three requirements FLT members must meet to assert standing
are actual injury, causation, and redressability. See id. The rele-
vant test to determine standing is whether the interest to be pro-
tected is arguably within the zone of interest contemplated by the
statute.
1. A member must suffer actual injury.
Members of FLT suffered actual injury from the complained-
of action. A diminished use and enjoyment of a natural resource
constitutes an injury that satisfies standing. See Sierra Club v.
Chemical Handling Corp., 778 F.Supp. 24 (D. Colo. 1991). Sierra
Club held that the "[s] tanding requirement for [an] environmental
organization's citizen suit under Resource Conservation and Re-
covery Act was satisfied by [the] alleged injury diminishing organ-
ization members' use and enjoyment of air and soils in [the]
neighborhood of defendant's facility and threatening members'
health and welfare." Id.
FLT members Steven Jones and Artimus Winfred can no
longer keep and eat the fish they catch from Lake Tokay due to
health risks associated with mercury pollution. Their use and en-
joyment of the Lake, a natural resource, has been substantially
diminished even though they continue to fish. Therefore, FLT
members have suffered an injury. This is an actual injury to the
members of FLT because they live near and use the Lake that has
been directly affected by Buena Vista's mercury pollution. Dimin-
ished use and enjoyment is sufficient to meet the standing re-
quirement in Sierra Club and is sufficient in this case as well.
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Likewise, the potential threat of future harm or injury is also
a factor in determining standing. The court in Supporters to Op-
pose Pollution, Inc. v. Heritage Group, 973 F.2d 1320 (7th Cir.
1992), held that a "citizens group representing persons living close
to the landfill, which had at least the potential to injure them, was
constitutionally permitted to litigate to enforce RCRA." Id. More-
over, the citizen suit provision of RCRA implies that there must be
a threat that is present now, although the impact of that threat
may not be felt until later. See Raytheon Co. v. McGraw-Edison,
979 F.Supp. 858 (D. Wis. 1997).
Congress recognizes the potential for injury from mercury
poisoning and is diligently attempting to establish regulations
concerning the operation of fossil-fuel fired electric utility steam
generating units, among other units, to reduce emissions of mer-
cury into the environment. See Omnibus Mercury Emissions Re-
duction Act of 1999, H.R. REP. No. 2667 (Aug. 2, 1999). New
standards for mercury emissions and the potential risks to the en-
vironment and to human health from mercury pollution are being
set. See id. Congress has specifically recognized that mercury
pollution is harmful to children and pregnant women, including
their fetuses, in contracting neurotoxicity, and that exposure can
occur through eating mercury contaminated fish, drinking water
or other contaminated food sources, dermal uptake through soil
and water, or from inhalation of contaminated air. See id.
There is current injury and the potential of future injury in
the present case. FLT members have the potential to be harmed
from eating the fish or from some future injury. Potential risks to
their health and environment include exposure through drinking
contaminated water, coming in contact with the soil surrounding
the Lake and water in the Lake, or from inhalation of contami-
nated air. All of these are possible injuries which pose a present
and future threat to FLT members. Based on the holdings in Sup-
porters to Oppose Pollution and Raytheon, this Court should find
that current injury and the potential for future injury exist in the
case at hand and that FLT meets the standing requirement of ac-
tual injury.
2. The injury must be fairly traceable to the challenged
act.
The injury in this case is fairly traceable to the challenged
act. The case or controversy limitation of Article III of the Consti-
tution requires that a court act only to redress injury that can be
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fairly traced to the challenged action of the defendant. See Simon
v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 41-42, (1976). A
plaintiff does not need to prove causation with absolute scientific
rigor because the "fairly traceable" requirement is not the same
requirement as the one in tort causation. See Public Interest Re-
search Group of New Jersey v. Powell Duffryn Terminals, Inc., 913
F.2d 64, 72 (3d Cir. 1990). The court simply requires that the
plaintiffs demonstrate that they are more than "concerned by-
standers" and that there is a "substantial likelihood" that the de-
fendants' conduct caused the plaintiffs harm. See id. (quoting
Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59,
75 (1978)).
Buena Vista owns and operates two mine-mouth, coal-fired
power plants in Blue Skies. (R. at 3.) The coal burned in the
plants contains mercury that, after combustion, is partially re-
leased into the air and atmosphere. See id. FLT and New Union
assert that these mercury particles are transported through the
atmosphere where they fall into the Lake or the watershed of the
Lake. (R. at 4.) The EPA conducted studies which conclude that
most of the mercury in the Lake originates from Buena Vista's two
power plants in Blue Skies. See id. Additionally, the New Union
Department of Public Health issued a health advisory, giving no-
tice that the fish living in the Lake contain levels of mercury that
could eventually cause mercury poisoning in humans. See id.
Thus, the EPA report and the New Union health advisory indicate
the mercury in the Lake is "fairly traceable" to Buena Vista's coal-
fired power plant emissions.
3. The injury must be redressable by judicial action.
The injury in this case is redressable by judicial action. A
plaintiff must show that his injury is "likely to be redressed by a
favorable decision." Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org.,
426 U.S. 26, 38 (1976). FLT filed an action to abate the endanger-
ment under section 7002 of RCRA, which gives this Court the au-
thority to grant injunctive relief. See Meghrig v. KFC Western,
Inc., 516 U.S. 479, 484 (1996).
The Supreme Court analyzed whether a defendant could be
held responsible for monetary damages associated with past
cleanup efforts under the citizen suit provisions of RCRA. See id.
The Court interpreted the plain meaning of the statute to imply
that a citizen suit brought under RCRA could seek a "mandatory
injunction, one that orders the responsible party to 'take action' by
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attending to the cleanup and proper disposal of toxic waste, or a
prohibitory injunction, one that 'restrains' a responsible party
from further violating RCRA," but that RCRA did not contemplate
the award of monetary damages. Id.
The lower court held that FLT's injuries were redressable in
an action at law based on Davies v. National Coop. Refinery Ass'n.,
963 F.Supp 990 (D. Kan. 1997) (ruling that the plaintiffs did not
have standing because having to use bottled water instead of
ground water was redressable in an action at law and therefore
not redressable through injunctive relief). However, under the
Supreme Court's holding in Meghrig, FLT's injuries are
redressable through injunctive relief. According to Meghrig, it is
the only relief allowed under the citizen suit provisions of RCRA.
Thus, FLT's injuries are redressable by the court.
4. The Injury Must be Within the 'Zone of Interest' Sought
to be Protected or Regulated by the Statute.
Another relevant test in determining standing is whether the
plaintiff alleged that the challenged action caused him injury in
fact and whether the interest to be protected is arguably within
the zone of interest sought to be regulated by the statute. See As-
sociation of Data Processing Serv. Org. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150
(1970).
The purpose of section 7002 of RCRA is to protect against per-
sons contributing to the past or present handling or disposal of
any solid or hazardous waste which may present an imminent and
substantial endangerment to health or the environment. Buena
Vista is disposing of a solid waste that presents an imminent and
substantial endangerment to health and the environment through
the mercury levels in the fish from Lake Tokay. Camp further
held that such interest "may reflect aesthetic, conservational and
recreational as well as economic values." Id. FLT's members have
lost their long-time recreational use of sport fishing because they
are not allowed to keep and eat the fish themselves nor share it
with friends, due to the health risks associated with eating mer-
cury-laden fish. Furthermore, the potential of future injury may
result from mercury inhalation or consumption of the lake water.
Therefore, the injury in this case is within the zone of interest
sought to be protected by the statute and the Court should redress
this endangerment. Conclusively, FLT and its members meet all
of the requirements to achieve standing under RCRA and Article
III. It has suffered an injury from the complained action, the in-
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jury is fairly traceable to the defendant's emissions, the injury is
redressible by judicial action and the injury is within the zone of
interest sought to be protected by the statute. Accordingly, FLT
requests that it be granted standing and the lower court's judg-
ment on this issue reversed.
III. THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY HELD THAT
NEW UNION HAS STANDING TO INTERVENE
IN THIS CASE.
The State of New Union has a dual right of intervention
under both section 7002 of RCRA and FED. R. Civ. P. 24 because it
is protecting the interest of its citizens in New Union, who are
affected by the mercury pollution, and its exclusion from this liti-
gation would impair or impede its ability to protect this interest.
A. A State Has Standing to Intervene in a Citizen Suit to
Protect the Rights of its Citizens via RCRA Section 7002
(b)(2)(E).
New Union has a right of intervention under RCRA section
7002 (b)(2)(E), which states in pertinent part that:
[I1n any action under subsection (a)(1)(B) of this section..., any
'person' may intervene as a matter of right when the applicant
claims an interest relating to the action and he is so situated
that the disposition of the action may, as a practical matter, im-
pair or impede his ability to protect that interest .
Id.
A state has been held to be a person and its right of interven-
tion as a person under RCRA has been established through case
law. In 1992, the Supreme Court held that "A [s]tate is a . . .
'person' under [the] Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
(RCRA) and is thus entitled to sue under the citizen suit sections
of those Acts." United States Dep't. of Energy v. Ohio, 503 U.S.
607, 616 (1992). Therefore, based on this definition of "person,"
New Union is entitled to intervene in the present case because
"any person may intervene as a matter of right when the applicant
claims an interest relating to the action." RCRA § 7002(b)(2)(E).
Additionally, case law has interpreted the primary purpose
and policy behind the notice and delay provision of RCRA as a
method of providing government agencies with the opportunity to
intervene in cases. See Zands, 779 F.Supp. at 1259. A state's
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right to intervene is an essential one that has been protected
through the use of statutory requirements and case law interpre-
tation of those statutes.
B. A State Has Standing to Intervene in a Citizen Suit as a
Matter of Right Under FED. R. Civ. P. 24.
Similar to the RCRA intervention statute, FED. R. CIv. P.
24(a) states that New Union may intervene as a matter of right in
this case. Specifically, FED. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(1) states that "upon
timely intervention anyone shall be permitted to intervene in an
action when a statute of the United States confers an uncondi-
tional right to intervene.. . ." As previously discussed, the RCRA
statute confers a right to intervene in cases brought under RCRA.
Furthermore, New Union has an interest in the affected prop-
erty. The Lake is located within its boundaries and is a natural
resource to be protected by the State. FLT's present interest is
limited to its members' injuries and protecting the Lake. On the
other hand, New Union's interest is inherent in protecting all of
its citizens and maintaining its natural resources for its citizens.
The district court in this case affirmed that a state automatically
has standing to sue for any injuries alleged to occur in the public
domain within its boundaries and, therefore, New Union does not
need to plead standing. (R. at 4, 7.) New Union asserts in its com-
plaint that the Lake is within the public domain and is wholly
within its boundaries. (R. at 7.) Thus, New Union is within the
scope of FED. R. CIv. P. 24(a)(2) and has a sufficient basis to assert
standing.
Conclusively, New Union has a right to intervene in this case
under section 7002(b)(2)(E) of RCRA and FED. R. Civ. P. 24 be-
cause it has standing to protect its citizens and natural resources
from injury. Furthermore, excluding New Union from this litiga-
tion would impair or impede its ability to protect this interest.
Therefore, FLT respectfully requests this Court to affirm the
lower court's judgement on this issue and affirm New Union's
standing.
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IV. THE DISTRICT COURT HAS THE AUTHORITY
UNDER RCRA TO ORDER ABATEMENT OF
BUENA VISTA'S MERCURY EMISSIONS WHEN
RCRA AUTHORIZES CITIZEN SUITS IN
RESPONSE TO IMMINENT AND SUBSTANTIAL
ENDANGERMENT.
A. Buena Vista Disposes of Hazardous Waste as Indicated in
RCRA section 3004.
RCRA, also known as the Solid Waste Disposal Act, is a com-
prehensive environmental statute that gives the EPA the power to
regulate the treatment, storage and disposal of solid and hazard-
ous waste "from cradle to grave." City of Chicago v. Environmen-
tal Defense Fund, 511 U.S. 328, 331 (1994). Although Buena
Vista's power plants emit mercury from its smoke stacks, these
emissions also constitute the disposal of hazardous waste.
As previously argued, and correctly decided by the lower
court, mercury is a solid waste governed under RCRA. The Code
of Federal Regulations ("C.F.R.") states that materials are solid
wastes if they are "abandoned" by being "disposed" of. See 40
C.F.R. § 261.2(b) (1999). Disposal is defined as the "discharge,
deposit,... or placing of any solid waste or hazardous waste into
or on any land or water." RCRA § 1004(3), 42 U.S.C. § 6903(3).
Therefore, Buena Vista's plants not only emit hazardous waste
into the atmosphere, but they also dispose of hazardous waste
when mercury particles are discharged onto the surrounding land
and water. It is clear from the plain language of RCRA that Con-
gress intended RCRA to regulate circumstances where hazardous
waste is disposed of, as is the case here.
B. Regulation of Buena Vista's Plants Under the CAA, Is Not
Detailed and Pervasive.
The CAA only regulates those sources of air pollution that
threaten national ambient air quality standards. See Todd Wes-
tersund, Are Insignificant Emissions Significant? The Air Operat-
ing Permit Program of the Clean Air Act, 27 ENVTL. L. 991, 992
(1997); see also 42 U.S.C. § 7401 et. seq. Because the CAA specifi-
cally regulates national ambient air quality standards, it does not
allow for comprehensive coverage of hazardous waste issues such
as the ones presented in this case.
One area the CAA does not presently regulate is the emission
limitation of mercury applicable to power plants. The EPA has
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promulgated mercury emission limitations under the CAA, how-
ever, they do not apply to power plants. "The provisions of this
subpart are applicable to those stationary sources which process
mercury ore to recover mercury . . . ." 40 C.F.R. § 61.50 (1999)
(emphasis added). FLT brought suit because air pollution emis-
sions from Buena Vista's two power plants are the source of mer-
cury on the surrounding land and in Lake Tokay. However, the
CAA does not provide for the appropriate regulation in this case.
Another example of the CAA's non-pervasive regulation of air
pollution is in the promulgated standards for fossil-fueled power
plants that do not contain limitations on mercury emissions. See
40 C.F.R. §§ 60.40, 60.40(a) (1999). Mercury is the waste at issue
in the present case. The CAA may be comprehensive in other situ-
ations but it does not provide for the appropriate comprehensive-
ness in this situation. In this case, the CAA does not establish a
complete regulatory procedure whereby mercury emission limita-
tions are identified and air quality standards are set and enforced.
The Supreme Court of the United States dealt with a similar
issue concerning the pervasiveness of regulatory environmental
acts in comparison to other methods of regulation in the City of
Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304 (1981). The Milwaukee case
dealt with the need for lawmaking of federal courts when Con-
gress addressed the issue of pollution in the Federal Water Pollu-
tion Control Act ("FWPCA"). See id. at 312-317. Illinois sued the
City of Milwaukee and the sewage commission alleging that un-
treated sewage overflows and inadequately treated sewage dis-
charged into Lake Michigan from its treatment plants caused a
threat to the health of Illinois citizens when transported by the
lake currents to Illinois water. See id. at 304. Illinois filed its
claim seeking abatement under federal common law for the public
nuisance allegedly created by the discharge. See id. After Illinois
brought its claim, Congress passed the FWPCA Amendments of
1972 that established a system of regulation that made it illegal
for anyone to discharge pollutants into the nation's water unless
they have a permit. See id. The Supreme Court held that no fed-
eral common law remedy was available to Illinois to seek abate-
ment of the nuisance caused by water pollution from the
defendant's facilities. See id. at 312-317. The Court felt in this
specific case, that where the statutory scheme occupies the spe-
cific field of pollution with a comprehensive regulatory program
that addresses the problem, a federal common law remedy for the
abatement is not available. See id.
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The test developed in the Milwaukee case led to courts con-
templating whether a federal common law cause of action for nui-
sance is, under the circumstances, pre-empted by the CAA. See
New England Legal Found. v. Costle 666 F.2d 30 (2d Cir. 1981);
United States v. Kin-Buc, Inc., 532 F. Supp. 699 (D.N.J. 1982) (rul-
ing that the Clean Air Act does not flatly pre-empt actions in the
area of air pollution based upon the federal common law of nui-
sance; however, under these specific circumstances, Congress had
directly addressed the problem at hand).
Additionally, courts have held that actions under the federal
common law of nuisance were not precluded by the CAA. The
court in California Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency v. Jennings, 594
F.2d 181 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 864, ruled that the
federal common law of nuisance was not precluded by the CAA.
See id. at 194. There, the Regional Planning Agency appealed the
district court's grant of Jennings' motion to dismiss and denial of
its motions for temporary injunction and for summary judgment
to prevent the construction of four hotel-casinos on the shore of
Lake Tahoe. See id. at 184. The Regional Planning Agency as-
serted that the Jennings' projects would create a nuisance by at-
tracting more cars and people to the Basin. See id. at 193.
Although the court ruled that the building of high rise hotels did
not constitute a nuisance, the court did determine that federal
common law nuisance actions are valid and not precluded by the
CAA or the FWPCA. See id. The court looked to the language of
the statutes and reasoned that "the CAA and the FWPCA each
have citizen suit provisions professing not to restrict any right
which any person . . . may have under any statute or common
law." Id. at 192. The court recognized that Congress did intend
for other actions under statute or common law to be available to
citizens. See id.
Similarly, a court held that, in enacting the CAA, Congress
did not divest the right to sue for injunctive relief under the com-
mon law of nuisance in air pollution cases. See United States v.
Atlantic-Richfield, Co., 478 F.Supp. 1215 (D. Mont. 1979). In At-
lantic, the United States brought an action against alleged air pol-
luters seeking damages for past injury to trees and wildlife and an
injunction ordering defendants to reduce fluoride emissions to a
level that would not cause further death or injury to vegetation
and wildlife. The defendants argued that common law relief was
not available because the congressional act preempted common
law remedies. See id. at 1218. The court ruled that there was no
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express language in the Act divesting the plaintiff of its injunctive
remedies; nor was there a clearly manifested intent to make the
CAA remedy the exclusive remedy. See id. at 1219.
The present case is analogous to the issues and arguments
presented above. RCRA is a statutory regulation enacted by Con-
gress. See 42 U.S.C § 6901. This Act empowers the federal gov-
ernment to regulate activities concerning solid and hazardous
waste. See id. The lower court incorrectly reasoned that Congress
intended the CAA to preclude RCRA. The Milwaukee court held
that the specific circumstances in that case led to the FWPCA
overriding a common law remedy. See City of Milwaukee, 541 U.S.
at 312-317. Courts have also affirmed that the CAA does not pre-
empt other remedies in all circumstances. Thus, courts have rec-
ognized that the CAA is not a comprehensive scheme to regulate
air pollution. Congress intended for people to have the ability to
seek various remedies, whether it is a common law remedy or it is
a statutory remedy such as RCRA.
In the present case, the CAA does not specifically deal with
the circumstances involved. The CAA does not contain regulation
for mercury emissions that come from power plants; nor does it
contain limitations on mercury emissions. The CAA does not ad-
dress all the specific circumstances in the present case and, thus,
it is not comprehensive and pervasive. Although Congress did in-
tend to avoid duplication within the regulatory statutes, Congress
also indicated that "such integration shall be affected only to the
extent that it can be done in a manner consistent with the goals
and polices expressed in this chapter and in the other acts . .. ."
RCRA § 1006, 42 U.S.C. § 6905. This is a case where duplication
is avoided. It is apparent that the CAA does not provide for com-
plete coverage in this situation. Therefore, as case law and Con-
gress indicate, other remedies are available and should be sought
out in order to achieve the overall policy of environmental stat-
utes. For this reason, courts do have equitable discretion under
RCRA to grant injunctive relief.
C. The Broad Language in Section 7002(a)(1)(B) Authorizes
District Courts to Exercise Equitable Authority to Order
Injunctive Relief.
RCRA was enacted in 1976 to provide technical and financial
assistance for the development of management plans and facilities
to regulate the management of hazardous waste. See 135 A.L.R.
Fed. 197 (1996). In 1984, RCRA was amended to assure adequate
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protection of public health and the environment. See id. Specifi-
cally, section 7002(a)(1)(B) of RCRA confers upon private plain-
tiffs a right to obtain relief from a federal district court. The lower
court erred in concluding that it did not have the equitable author-
ity under RCRA to order abatement of mercury emissions. The
broad language of section 7002 requires district courts "to take
such other action as may be necessary" in cases where private
plaintiffs establish the liability of other parties for conditions that
may present an endangerment to the environment or health.
RCRA § 7002(a)(1)(B). RCRA authorizes the federal government
to regulate activities concerning solid waste and hazardous waste.
RCRA also contains citizen suit provisions that authorize pri-
vate parties to commence civil action in response to waste activi-
ties that present an "imminent and substantial endangerment."
RCRA § 7002(a)(1)(B). Section 7002 allows private citizens and
other "persons" to bring a civil suit against any person alleged to
be in violation of any permit, standard, regulation, condition, re-
quirement, prohibition, or order under the Act. See RCRA
§ 7002(a)(1)(A). However, unlike other environmental statutes,
RCRA also authorizes citizen actions to address imminent
hazards. See RCRA § 7002(a)(1)(B).
The Supreme Court has observed in cases involving citizen
suit provisions, "the starting point for interpreting a statute is the
language of the statute itself." Hallstrom v. Tillamook County,
493 U.S. 20, 25 (1989); see also Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v.
Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., 484 U.S. 49, 56 (1987). The lan-
guage of RCRA states that any person may commence a suit
against any person who is contributing to "the past or present
handling,... or disposal of any solid or hazardous waste which
may present an imminent and substantial endangerment to
health or environment." RCRA § 7002(a)(1)(B). The legislative
history supports the natural reading of the statute. For example,
Congress broadened the scope of section 7002(a)(1)(B) of RCRA in
the Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. No.
98-616, § 401(a)-(b), 98 Stat. 3268-3269. The House committee re-
port explaining those amendments states that RCRA "confers on a
citizen a limited right to sue to abate an imminent and substantial
endangerment" pursuant to liability standards under § 7003 of
RCRA, which "will complement, rather than conflict with, the Ad-
ministrator's efforts to eliminate threats as to public health and
the environment, particularly where the Government is unable to
take action because of inadequate resources." H.R. REP. No. 98-
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198, at 53 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5612; see also S.
REP. No. 98-284 (1983). The committee report makes it clear that
Congress used broad language in the statute in order to avoid re-
stricting a citizen's right to sue.
RCRA authorizes a citizen suit whenever hazardous waste ac-
tivities "may present an imminent and substantial endanger-
ment." 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(B). Courts have recognized that
this language provides relief in a broad variety of circumstances.
See, e.g., Dague v. City of Burlington, 935 F.2d 1343 (2d Cir. 1991),
rev'd in part on other grounds, 505 U.S. 557 (1992); Comite Pro
Rescate de La Salud v. Puerto Rico Aqueduct & Sewer Authority,
888 F.2d 180 (1st Cir. 1989) (dealing with factory waste), cert. de-
nied, 494 U.S. 1029 (1990). Through the courts' recognition of cer-
tain statutory terms, they have held that the phrase "may present
an imminent and substantial endangerment" indicates that a citi-
zen may bring suit if there is a reasonable possibility of imminent
danger. Dague, 935 F.2d at 1355-1456 (holding that the language
does not require a showing that actual harm will occur immedi-
ately so long as the risk of threatened harm is present) (quoting
Environmental Defense Fund v. Envtl. Protection Agency, 465 F.2d
528, 535 (D.C. Cir. 1972)). Additionally, courts have indicated
that while the threat of danger must be "substantial," that re-
quirement will be satisfied if "there exists a concern for the integ-
rity of the public health or the environment." United States v.
Valentine, 856 F.Supp. 621, 626 (D. Wyo. 1994); See also United
States v. Conservation Chem. Co., 619 F.Supp. 162, 194 (W.D. Mo.
1985) (holding that the word "substantial" does not require quan-
tification of endangerment). The facts in the present case easily
fit into the broad language of RCRA. Buena Vista admits that the
coal burned in its power plants contains mercury, and particles of
mercury are released up the plants' stacks. (R. at 3.) Buena Vista
also admits that the mercury that is not captured in the air pollu-
tion equipment is emitted into the atmosphere. See id. The EPA
conducted studies of the mercury in the Lake and found that it
originated from Buena Vista's two power plants. (R. at 4.) As a
result of the mercury emitted from Buena Vista's smoke stacks,
the water and fish have become contaminated. This is the exact
endangerment that RCRA was designed to address. As indicated
in the above cases, courts have held that a citizen may bring suit
as long as there is a reasonable possibility of imminent danger.
See Dague, 935 F.2d at 1355-1356. The possibility of imminent
danger in this case is people eating the contaminated fish from the
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Lake or drinking the contaminated water. This does satisfy, as
courts have held, "a reasonable cause for concern for the integrity
of the public health or the environment." Valentine, 856 F.Supp.
626. For these reasons, the broad language of RCRA covers the
mercury emissions from Buena Vista's smoke stacks and, thus,
the lower court has the equitable authority under RCRA to order
abatement of the emissions.
V. THE CIRCUIT COURT LACKS THE AUTHORITY TO
DETERMINE IF FLT IS PRECLUDED FROM
BRINGING THIS CLAIM UNDER RCRA § 7002,
THE DOCTRINES OF RES JUDICATA, OR
COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL BECAUSE THE DISTRICT
COURT DID NOT RULE ON BUENA VISTA'S
MOTION TO DISMISS.
Under the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1331, "[tlhe district courts
shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under
the ... laws ... of the United States." (emphasis added). Accord-
ingly, the district court has original jurisdiction to decide a federal
question.
The courts of appeals have jurisdiction over appeals from all
final decisions of the district courts of the United States. See 28
U.S.C. § 1291. The legislative history of section 1291 has re-
mained substantially the same since the codification of Title 28 in
1948, and its relevant predecessor section, 28 U.S.C. § 225(a)
(1940), stated that "[tihe circuit courts of appeal shall have appel-
late jurisdiction to review by appeal final decisions." (emphasis
added). "Decision" is defined by Black's Law Dictionary (6th ed.
1990), as "a judgment, decree, or order pronounced by a court in
settlement of a controversy submitted to it."
In this case, FLT filed suit against Buena Vista on the theory
that the air pollution emissions from its two power plants are an
imminent and substantial endangerment, pursuant to RCRA sec-
tion 7002(a)(1)(B). (R. at 1, 3). Because the district court granted
Buena Vista's motion for summary judgment, it did not even ad-
dress the issue, much less render a decision, on Buena Vista's mo-
tion to dismiss. (R. at 9). Inasmuch as there is no decision
rendered by the district court for this Court to review, the Circuit
Court lacks jurisdiction to review it.
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VI. FLT's CLAIM IS NOT PRECLUDED UNDER
SECTION 7002 OF RCRA OR THE PRECLUSION
DOCTRINES, WHEN CONGRESS INTENDED IT
BE BROUGHT IN FEDERAL COURT, AND
NEITHER THE ADMINISTRATOR OF EPA NOR
THE STATE FILED SUIT.
A. Section 7002 of RCRA Does Not Preclude FLT From
Bringing This Action.
FLT is not precluded from bringing this action under section
7002 of RCRA because neither the Administrator of EPA nor the
State of New Union were actively engaged or diligently prosecut-
ing Buena Vista for its failure to contain mercury emissions so as
to avoid imminent and substantial endangerment to the citizens
of New Union at the time FLT filed its citizen suit. There are only
two reasons a citizen suit is barred under RCRA: either (1) the
Administrator of the EPA is actively engaged and diligently prose-
cuting an action against the violator; or (2) the State is actively
engaged and diligently prosecuting an action to stop the activity
or correct the condition causing the alleged endangerment. See 42
U.S.C. § 6972 (b)(2)(B) and (b)(2)(C). The citizen suit provisions
has taken broad steps to facilitate the individual citizen's role in
the enforcement of federal environmental statutes. See Natural
Resources Defense Council v. Train, 510 F.2d 692, 700 (D.C. Cir.
1974). However, as set forth in Gwaltney of Smithfield v. Chesa-
peake Bay Found., Inc., 484 U.S. 49, 60-61 (1987), Congress in-
tended citizen suits to play an "interstitial" rather than a
"potentially intrusive" role. Recognizing the obvious danger that
unlimited citizen suits would overburden the courts, Congress
limited a plaintiffs right to bring a section 7002 RCRA citizen suit
against a defendant in certain circumstances. See Friends of the
Earth v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 768 F.2d 57, 63 (2d Cir. 1985).
Accordingly, a citizen suit is proper only when the state and fed-
eral authorities have declined to utilize their enforcement author-
ity. See Arkansas Wildlife Fed. v. ICIAmericas, Inc., 29 F.3d 376,
380 (8th Cir. 1994).
The Eastern District of Texas dealt with a similar issue when
it concluded that an inquiry must be made to determine whether a
pending action in State court was an "action under subsection
(a)(1)(b), so as to bar the plaintiffs imminent and substantial en-
dangerment claim." Glazer v. American Ecology Envtl. Services
Corp., 894 F.Supp. 1029, 1035 (E.D. Tex. 1995). The Texas court
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followed the two-part analysis developed in Connecticut Fund for
the Env't v. Contract Plating Co. 631 F.Supp. 1291, 1293 (D. Conn.
1986) and inquired whether (1) the action by the state of Texas
was pending in state court on the date the citizen suit was filed;
and if so, whether it was seeking to require compliance with the
same standards and RCRA regulation, for the same violations the
citizen suit was based on; and (2) whether there was diligent pros-
ecution. See id. The Glazer court explained that the federal court
would have jurisdiction if a different CAA standard or a different
RCRA regulation was at issue, and that to "conclude otherwise
would defeat the purpose of the citizen suit provisions, which is to
provide a mechanism for a private plaintiff to enforce CAA and
RCRA." Id. The district court held that plaintiffs could enforce
Texas' hazardous waste program by bringing a citizen suit under
RCRA after comparing the pleadings and finding the citizen suit
addressed other violations of the CAA and RCRA not in question
in the state case. See id. at 1036. Thus, for purposes of the stat-
ute, no action was pending at the time the citizen's suit was com-
menced. See id.
In this case, the Bluepeace suit was filed by an environmental
group from the State of Blue Skies in state court based on state
claims of trespass and nuisance. (R. at 10.) Even though the state
court decision was not rendered until after FLT commenced its
suit, the claims were not brought under section 7002 of RCRA, nor
were they claims for imminent and substantial endangerment.
(R. at 11.) Moreover, neither the Administrator nor the State filed
an action prior to or after FLT gave notice. Rather, New Union
intervened after FLT filed suit. (R. at 1.)
Therefore, even though a state court action involving the
same defendant was pending at the time FLT filed its suit, RCRA
was not an issue in the state action, rendering the limitations set
forth in the citizen suit provisions of section 7002 of RCRA inap-
plicable. Consequently, this Court should determine that no rele-
vant action was pending and that FLT is authorized to bring this
action under section 7002 of RCRA.
B. The Doctrines of Res Judicata and Collateral Estoppel Do
Not Preclude FLT from Bringing This Action.
The fundamental policy underlying the doctrines of res judi-
cata and collateral estoppel is that a "right, question[,] or fact dis-
tinctly put in issue and directly determined by a court of
competent jurisdiction.., cannot be disputed in a subsequent suit
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between the same parties or their privies ... ." Montana v. United
States, 440 U.S. 147, 153 (1979). The doctrines ofresjudicata and
collateral estoppel do not bar FLT from bringing suit against
Buena Vista because violations of RCRA were not previously liti-
gated in the Bluepeace case filed against Buena Vista in the state
court of Blue Skies.
The doctrine of res judicata provides a complete bar to reliti-
gation of the same claim, demand, or cause of action between the
same parties which has been previously decided by a court. See
Black's Law Dictionary (6th ed. 1990). It does not affect the rights
of those who are neither parties, nor in privity with a party to the
action and is "part of our deep-rooted historic tradition that every-
one should have his own day in court." Martin v. Wilkes, 490 U.S.
755, 760 (1989). The doctrine of collateral estoppel also prevents
relitigation between the same parties of a particular issue or ulti-
mate fact which has been previously decided by a court. See
BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990). Furthermore, a citizen
suit under RCRA is not barred, even though the suit duplicates
actions pending or already decided in state courts, because the
plaintiff could not have raised its RCRA claim in state court. See
Middlesex Co. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders v. State of New Jersey,
Dep't of Envt'l Protection, 645 F.Supp. 715 (D.N.J. 1986).
The District Court for New Jersey examined a similar issue in
an action brought by the county under RCRA alleging imminent
and substantial endangerment to health or environment as a re-
sult of conditions at a landfill. See id. at 717. The defendants
moved to dismiss the suit because it duplicated actions pending or
already decided in the state courts. See id. at 718. In holding the
action was not barred under collateral estoppel, the court rea-
soned that the plaintiff could not have raised its RCRA claim in
the state courts because 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a) grants exclusive ju-
risdiction over citizen suits to the United States Courts. See id. at
719.
It was contemplated by the legislative plan that state pro-
ceedings could be pending relating to a solid or hazardous waste
facility and a citizen suit relating to the same facility could pro-
ceed under RCRA in federal court. See 42 U.S.C. § 6972(f). A
careful examination of the legislative history reveals that while
Congress did not prohibit "a citizen from raising claims under
state law in a § 7002 action, the Committee expects courts to exer-
cise their discretion concerning pendent jurisdiction. . ." H.R. RE-
PORT No. 98-198 at 53, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5612.
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Because pendant jurisdiction refers to federal courts accepting
state law claims, the court reasoned that Congress did not envi-
sion RCRA suits would be brought in state courts. See Middlesex
at 720. Thus, the doctrine of collateral estoppel did not apply. See
id.
The issue litigated in Bluepeace was whether plaintiffs had
the right to bring an action seeking an injunction under state law
based on trespass, public nuisance or private nuisance, due to ex-
cessive mercury emissions. (R. at 11.) The Blue Skies court con-
cluded that the claim for equitable relief was not within the state
court's power to grant because a review of the permits' failure to
contain emission limitations or a determination of emission limi-
tations on mercury was more properly determined by either the
legislative or administrative process. (R. at 13.)
In this case, FLT and New Union are bringing a federal claim
for abatement under RCRA based on imminent and substantial
endangerment to public health. (R. at 1, 3.) Buena Vista urges
this Court to believe that this precise issue has already been de-
cided by the state court in Blue Skies and therefore, FLT is pre-
cluded from pursuing further litigation. (R. at 1, 5.) However,
Bluepeace was an action in equity under the Blue Sky Clean Skies
Act ("BSCS") for trespass, public nuisance and private nuisance, a
state claim, whereas the case at hand is an action seeking an in-
junction based on an imminent and substantial endangerment to
public health under RCRA, a federal claim. Furthermore, while
the court in Bluepeace determined that the provisions of BSCS
prohibited the court from granting an injunction, RCRA allows
only injunctive relief, prohibiting damages in any form. Moreover,
it has been determined that RCRA claims are to be brought in
federal court and not in state court. Thus, FLT is not attempting
to relitigate the same issue or claim previously litigated in the
state courts.
Furthermore, res judicata requires the same parties to the re-
litigated action. The prior action against Buena Vista Power
Company was brought by Bluepeace, a Blue Skies corporation,
whereas this case is brought by Friends of Lake Tokay, Inc., which
was organized to protect Lake Tokay in the State of New Union.
FLT was not a party, was located in a different state, and not in
privity with Bluepeace.
FLT's claim for imminent and substantial endangerment is a
federal claim, not a state claim, involving a different plaintiff, who
was not a party or privy to the previous suit filed by Blue Peace.
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Furthermore, neither the Administrator of EPA nor the State of
New Union were actively engaged or diligently prosecuting any
action to stop or reduce the cause of the endangerment, Buena
Vista's power plants' mercury emissions. Thus, if this Court de-
termines it has jurisdiction or that it should decide the issue, it
should conclude that section 7002 of RCRA authorizes FLT's citi-
zen suit, and the preclusion doctrines of res judicata and collateral
estoppel are inapplicable.
CONCLUSION
The district court correctly denied Buena Vista's motion for
summary judgment when it determined that the mercury found in
the Lake constitutes solid waste. The mercury becomes solid
waste when Buena Vista disposes of it because the particles are
abandoned in and around the Lake. While it correctly held that
New Union has standing to intervene on behalf of its citizens, the
district court incorrectly denied FLT's standing to sue. Since mer-
cury particulates are solid waste disposed of by Buena Vista, and
creates an imminent and substantial endangerment by bioaccum-
mulating in the fish in the Lake, FLT's members have suffered an
actual harm that is traceable to Buena Vista's mercury emissions,
redressible by judicial action, and within the zone of interest
sought to be protected by RCRA.
Moreover, the CAA is not so pervasive as to prevent injunc-
tive relief under RCRA because the CAA does not address mer-
cury emission limitations from power plants. Additionally, the
Circuit Court should not review Buena Vista's motionto dismiss
because it does not fall within its jurisdiction since the district
court did not render a decision on it. However, if this Court
should determine it has the authority to do so, Buena Vista's mo-
tion to dismiss should be denied. Inasmuch as Congress intended
RCRA claims to be brought in federal court, FLT's claim is not
barred under the preclusion doctrines because it could not have
been brought in the state court action. Nor is FLT's claim barred
under RCRA since neither the Administrator of the EPA nor the
State of New Union were actively pursuing a claim against Buena
Vista.
For the reasons stated in this brief, Friends of Lake Tokay,
Inc. respectfully requests this Court to affirm the district court's
holding that mercury is a solid waste and that New Union has
standing to intervene. FLT further requests the Circuit Court to
vacate so much of the judgment entered by the district court hold-
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ing that FLT has no standing to sue and its claim is barred under
the CAA, and remand for a full trial on the merits of the case,
while denying Buena Vista's petition to review its pending motion
to dismiss.
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